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POINT I
THE COURTS HOLDING THAT THE CREDIT IS NOT
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POINT II
QUANTUM MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WAS NOT
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NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER SERVICE ON
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POINT IV
THE COURTS DEFERENCE TO THE LOWER COURT ON
CREDIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY MISSED
THE POINT THAT THE LOWER COURTS nNDINGS WERE
NOT BASED ON CREDIBILITY BUT ON THE LEGAL ISSUE OF
REASONABLENESS.

STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation, successor-ininterest to AMERICAN SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation,
Case No. 930450-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

JOHN L. MARGETTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing in this matter on the
grounds that the Memorandum Decision filed October 20, 1994, appears to be based upon
an incorrect assumption as to essential facts and a misperception of the law established by
applicable cases.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On October 3, 1980, Margetts entered into an Exchange Agreement with
Garden Falls Condominiums, the predecessor in interest of New West, by which Margetts
agreed to exchange a condominium in Park City for a condominium in what later became
known as Terrace Falls Condominiums at Third Avenue and "A" Street in Salt Lake City.
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Because the Terrace Falls Condominiums had not yet been built, Margetts was given a Trust
Deed on the Terrace Falls Condominiums as security for conveyance to him of the
completed condominium.
2. On December 9, 1981, Garden Falls Condominiums persuaded Margetts to
enter into a new agreement, a Condominium Acquisition Agreement, with Terrace Falls
Condominiums, a limited partnership, the new name for Garden Falls Condominiums, by
which Margetts would receive credit towards the purchase of a designated condominium unit
in the project of $200,000.00 plus 15% thereof per year from December 9, 1981 until the
date of closing in return for a subordination of his Trust Deed against the project to
construction financing (Exh.2). A new trust deed in favor of Margetts was recorded
December 22, 1981 (Exh. 3).

Other parties with claims similar to Margetts' also

subordinated their liens against the property (R. 538, p.32).
3. By September of 1984, the condominium project was only partially completed,
the construction financing with American was in default and Terrace Falls Condominiums
had agreed to deed the project to American in lieu of foreclosure upon obtaining releases
of the liens of other creditors in order to avoid the negative publicity of a foreclosure and
accomplish a smooth, quick and easy transition (R. 538, pp. 39-41). A written Real Property
Purchase and Sale Agreement (Exh. 4) was prepared and eventually signed by which
American purchased from Terrace Falls Condominiums the entire project including all
personal and intangible property such as "the business of selling or leasing units, or the
ownership or rental of condominiums," the name 'Terrace Falls," and "any other rights of
[Terrace Falls] or its predecessor in interest in connection with the Property" (Exh. 4,K 2).
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4. On September 6, 1984, Gerald Snow, an attorney, called Margetts' attorney,
requesting Margetts to meet with Lee Stevens of American Savings & Loan, the construction
lender on the Terrace Falls Condominiums, on September 12,1984 (R.539, p.292). This was
followed by a letter from Gerald Snow, dated September 7, 1984, confirming this request
(Exh. 5).
5. At the meeting on September 12, 1984, Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens of
American Savings & Loan told Margetts that Terrace Falls Condominiums and its principals
were insolvent and that American Savings and Loan was going to foreclose its first trust
deed against the Terrace Falls Condominiums and cut off all of Margetts' rights therein
unless it could obtain a release of all junior liens against the project, including Margetts'
trust deed. Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens offered Mr. Margetts $20,000.00 for a release of his
trust deed against the condominium project. Margetts refused this offer and left the
meeting. Mr. Snow called later to increase the offer to $50,000.00 or a credit of $150,000.00
towards the purchase of a condominium (R. 539, pp. 203-4; R. 538, pp. 61-63).
6.

Mr. Snow prepared and delivered several agreements (Condominium

Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General Release, and Request for
Reconveyance-Exh. 6-9, 15), giving Margetts the $150,000.00 credit and made several
requests of Margetts and his attorney over the next two months that the agreements be
signed and returned because all other lien holders had settled and Margetts was holding up
the whole settlement (R. 539, pp.268-274, 206-207; R. 538, p. 135). Margetts refused to do
so.
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7. Because Margetts was leaving town for two weeks and Mr. Snow was anxious
to conclude a settlement with Margetts, Mr. Snow arranged a meeting with Margetts, without
his attorney, on November 14,1984. Margetts again refused to sign the agreements (R. 538,
pp.125-6; R. 539, p. 210). Mr. Snow asked him to return that afternoon at which time Mr.
Snow thought he could present a better deal to him (R. 539, p. 211).
8. Margetts met with Mr. Snow again that afternoon at which time he was
presented with an additional agreement with Terrace Falls Condominiums (Exh. 10 and 16)
which would give him an additional credit towards the purchase of the designated
condominium unit of 20% of the proceeds of the sale of other units in the condominium
project as an inducement to get him to sign the previously prepared condominium purchase
agreement, settlement agreement, general release, and request for reconveyance. Mr. Snow
assured Margetts that the other agreements would not be delivered until this twenty percent
agreement was signed and that American Savings would be bound by that agreement. Mr.
Margetts thereupon signed all the agreements (R. 538, pp. 139-140; R. 539, pp. 212-214).
He further told Margetts that he would get what he wanted by that agreement, that only
seven condominiums had to be sold to completely pay for his condominium, and that
American Savings did not have to sign the agreement to be bound by it because American
would be Terrace Falls Condominiums.
9. Margetts' trust deed in the project was reconveyed (Exh. 11) and Terrace
Falls Condominiums gave to American Savings and Loan a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure
conveying the entire project to American and American took over the completion and
operation of the project (Exh. 4).
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10. These agreements called for the closing of the sale of the condominium unit
to Margetts after it was ready for occupancy and certain specified finish items had been
completed in the unit, which would be no later than June 30, 1985 (Exh. 6,11 6; Exh. 7,11 6).
11. American did not complete the unit by June 30, 1985 and did not finish the
unit as required by the agreement (Exh. 22, 24-27). Margetts paid some $9,234.00 of his
own money to finish the unit (R. 465, p.3) and he was told by American's attorney to move
into the unit on August 25, 1985 even though American did not have a certificate of
occupancy and could not deliver title to Margetts (R.539, p. 226-8).
12. After Margetts moved into the unit, American dismissed their security
personnel on the project relying on Margetts5 presence in the project as security for the
whole project (R. 539, p. 233).
13. American did not form the owners association for the condominium project
until September 1, 1987 and told Margetts not to pay any assessments, taxes, or rent on the
unit (R. 539, pp. 233-5).
14. In reliance on the twenty percent agreement signed as an inducement for
Margetts to enter into the Condominium Purchase Agreement and other agreements,
Margetts persuaded five of his acquaintances to buy condominium units in the project (R.
539, p. 230).
15. When American was finally prepared to close the transaction and convey
title to Margetts, it refused to give him credit for 20% of the proceeds of units sold to
purchasers obtained by Margetts or for the cost of finish items paid by Margetts. It also
refused to allow him to select another unit as provided in the agreements.
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16. On March 25, 1989, New West, as the successor-in-interest to American,
caused a Notice to Quit to be mailed to Margetts demanding that he vacate the unit within
five (5) days (R. 538, p. 178).
17. When Margetts did not vacate the unit, New West commenced this action
for unlawful detainer (R. 2-24) and Margetts filed a counterclaim asserting that he was
entitled to a deed to the unit, that he was induced by fraud and deception to surrender his
trust deed on the project and to pay an additional $134,283.00 for his unit and that he was
entitled to a credit for the finish items paid for by him and further amounts for security
services against the purchase price of his unit (R. 27-51).
18. Trial was held November 14-16, 1989, resulting in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 512-20) and Judgment (R. 522-24), dated April 23, 1990, which
judgment included rent prior to the Notice to Quit and prejudgment interest thereon as well
as treble damages after the Notice to Quit and attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining
possession of the condominium unit.
19. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals and, after hearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court
for failure to make sufficient findings of fact and remanded the case on the issues of agency,
fraud and remedies with instructions to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are
being awarded" and "with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may
deem appropriate." The Court of Appeals further stated !twe do not intend our remand to
be merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached (R. 54345).
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20. On remand, New West merely submitted supplemental findings of fact and
conclusions of law to bolster and support the conclusion already reached and, without
conducting further proceedings except oral argument by counsel, the lower court adopted
those supplemental findings and conclusions with only minor changes in wording. The lower
court did not enter any further findings on the issue of remedies and did not clarify why both
forfeiture and rent were awarded (R. 851-862). New West submitted a form of judgment
to the lower court which included an award of attorney's fees incurred after remand. After
objection by Margetts, the lower court entered a new judgment on January 11,1993, striking
out the award of attorney's fees incurred after remand, but again awarding New West a
judgment in the amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble
damages, plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the
condominium and granting possession thereof to New West. The judgment also awarded
New West additional prejudgment interest on the entire judgment to the date thereof (R.
872-74).
21. Upon reconsideration of the matter, this Court, by Memorandum Decision
filed October 20, 1994, held:
1) That the "$150,000 credit did not represent money or tangible property
actually paid to American Savings that would be subject to unjust forfeiture in favor of
American Savings . . . [and] does not equate to the cash payments that have been the subject
of judicial intervention to set aside unconscionable forfeitures in the real estate contract
context." [Memorandum Decision, page 3].
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2) That "Margetts is liable for the fair rental value for the period after he
remained on the premises without permission, even absent a lease or similar possessory
agreement. New West is therefore entitled to fair rental value on the basis of quantum
meruit, even though no enforceable written or oral contract existed.1' [Memorandum
Decision, page 3].
3) That "Margetts is liable for treble damages under the Utah unlawful
detainer statute despite his contention that New West failed to comply with service
requirements for the Notice to Quit as set forth in Utah Code ann. § 78-36-6 (Supp. 1994)."
[Memorandum Decision, pages 3-4].
4) That "the trial court's findings are intellectually troubling because the
court made judgments about the credibility and demeanor of witnesses three years after trial,
as a matter of institutional necessity we have no choice but to defer to the trial court's
determination in this respect." [Memorandum Decision, page 2].
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURTS HOLDING THAT THE CREDIT IS NOT
SUBJECT TO AN UNJUST FORFEITURE IS CONTRARY TO
SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS AND TO THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO A TRANSFEREE WHO TAKES SUBJECT TO
OUTSTANDING EQUITABLE CLAIMS AND INTERESTS.
The Court's Memorandum Decision recognized the principle established in
numerous Utah cases that an unconscionable forfeiture will not be allowed and a buyer,
after defaulting on his contract, may recoverfromthe seller the amounts received which do
not bear a reasonable relationship to the seller's actual damages. The Court's decision also
recognized the significant losses suffered by Margetts in the loss of his entire interest in the
condominium, which represented a loss to him of over $300,000 but was a loss for which
8

American had agreed to credit him for $150,000. The Court, however, claims that the
principle of unconscionable forfeiture does not apply because American did not receive any
money or tangible property from Margetts in the amount of $150,000. It is submitted that
this conclusion is contrary to both the spirit and substance of the Utah cases and to the law
applicable to a transferee of property, such as American, who is not a bona fide purchaser
and who, therefore, takes the property subject to all outstanding equitable claims and
interests.
First, one must realize that even though American did not receive cash or
property from Margetts when the contract was entered into, it did receive something of
substantial value to it. American agreed that it was worth $150,000 to it to obtain a release
of Margetts' lien and to avoid the complications, costs, time and adverse publicity of a
formal foreclosure as well as the prospects of a lengthy and expensive Chapter 11
bankruptcy. Without Margetts' release of lien, the whole transaction with the developers of
the project and with the other creditors would have fallen apart and American would have
had to foreclose and go through a lengthy Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding that the
developers had threatened. It knew that the value of the project would decrease a great
deal more than the $150,000 during that process and that its expenses in that process would
also be substantial. To agree to allow Margetts a credit of $150,000 was the equivalent of
putting at least $150,000 cash into American's pocket. It is simply unrealistic to say that
American did not receive anything of value.
Second, after the forfeiture of Margetts' interest in the condominium, American
received the entire interest in that condominium with no obligation to reimburse anything
to Margetts. American, therefore, ended up with the $150,000 interest in the condominium
that Margetts held which it could turn around and sell to another buyer. That, too, was the
equivalent of putting $150,000 into American's pocket. To suggest that the principle of
unconscionable forfeiture does not apply in such circumstances is to miss the whole point
of the principle involved in these cases.
It is true that most of the Utah cases which establish this principle recite that
cash was paid by the buyer to the seller, a portion of which must be reimbursed. But the
opinions in most of those cases emphasize the principle involved and do not necessarily
9

recite whether the payments made were in cash, credit or something else which the parties
agreed had cash value. It is clear from those cases, however, that the principle applies
whether or not the cash or other value was given or received by the original buyer or seller
under the contract when an assignment has been made of either the buyer's or seller's
interest. For example, in one of the most recent cases, Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089
(Utah 1991), the court held that liquidated damages of $76,190.36 did not bear a reasonable
relationship to actual damages of $50,132.13 and ordered the difference of $26,058.33
returned to the buyer. In that case, however, it was not the original buyer who had paid the
$76,132.13, who brought the suit and received the reimbursement of $26,058.33. It was an
assignee of the buyer's interest, who made none of the contract payments and who
apparently gave nothing to the buyer for his interest (at least the court's opinion does not
disclose that anything was paid by the assignee for that interest), to whom the
reimbursement was ordered! If the assignee of the buyer, who made no payments under the
contract, can recover an unconscionable forfeiture from the seller, surely the buyer who
made those payments can recover an unconscionable forfeiture from the assignee of a seller
who receives the title to the property from his assignor. That principle would apply even
when the seller's assignee who took over the seller's position in the property even though
he did not receive any separate consideration for the agreement, as was the case with
American. In L. Q. Development. Oreg. v. Mallorv. 98 Ore. App. 121, 778 P.2d 972
(Ore.App. 1989), the buyers made the down payment on a purchase contract and several
installment payments and then assigned their buyers' interest to the plaintiff, who continued
to make payments to the seller. The seller who received all of the payments under the
contract assigned the seller's interest to the defendant for no consideration. When a dispute
arose over the contract, the buyers' assignee sued the seller's assignee for restitution of the
payments made. The court determined that the contract itself was invalid and restitution
should be ordered but the critical issue in that case was whether the seller's assignee, who
received none of the payments, had a duty to make restitution of the money that both the
buyers and the buyers' assignee had paid to the seller. The court held that the seller's
assignee had such a duty in these words:
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We hold that defendant has that duty. He holds the vendor's
interest in the real property that purchasers expected seller to
release to purchasers in exchange for their payments. Defendant is
unjustly enriched, at least to the extent that he holds property that
purchasers or plaintiff should have received. He has throughout had
actual knowledge of the agreement and payments made to seller and
her estate. He was involved in the negotiation and closing of the
contract on seller's behalf.
He also intended to step into seller's shoes with respect to the
contract
He asserted a right to the balance of the payments for
the real estate and, after plaintiff filed the action, he counterclaimed
for foreclosure. See Kunzman v. Thorsen, 303 Or. 600, 610, 740
P.2d 754 (1987); Restatement (Second) Contracts §§ 328, 336.
Under these circumstances, defendant also assumed the quasicontractual duty of seller to make restitution to plaintiff. Defendant
must reimburse plaintiff $248,814.60, the money that purchasers and
plaintiff paid . . . .
Those circumstances are all present in this case except that American was not
an assignee of the seller but was the seller itself and was totally involved in and aware of all
the circumstances. It held the vendor's interest in the condominium to be released to
Margetts upon receipt of the balance of the payments. It is unjustly enriched by having
received what Margetts had paid for and did not receive. It had actual knowledge of the
agreement and the payments made and was involved in the negotiation and closing of the
contract. It stepped into the shoes of the prior parties who did receive payments from
Margetts, it asserted a right to the balance of the payments for the condominium and it sued
to enforce that contract. Under these circumstances, it also assumed the duty to make
restitution to Margetts.
In the Mallorv case, the Oregon Court of Appeals relied upon the prior case
from the Supreme Court of Oregon, Kunzman v. Thorsen. supra, which carefully analyzed
the Restatement of Contracts and numerous cases upon which the Restatement is based and
concluded, at page 759:
An assignee "claims the benefits" of a land sale contract when he or
she exercises the rights in the contract's subject matter conferred
upon the vendee by the contract. When a party accepts a broadly
worded assignment of a land sale contract, "steps into the shoes" of
the assignor and asserts the interests the contract conveys, the
11

presumption arises that the assignee intended also to assume the
duties the contract imposes.
Consistent with these cases is Irwin Concrete. Inc. v. Sun Coast Properties, Inc.. 33
Wash.App. 190, 653 P.2d 1331 (Wash.App. 1982), which held that subcontractors on a real
estate project, whose liens for unpaid work had been dismissed by foreclosure, could
nevertheless recover the value of their work from the lender who had purchased the
property at the trustee's sale.

The lender, of course, had no contract with these

subcontractors but did receive the property which had been improved by them. In our case,
American was the lender on the project which it took over, not by foreclosure which would
have eliminated all subordinate liens and interests, but by a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and
agreement by which it assumed responsibility for all outstanding liens and interests and
stepped into the shoes of the developer. In the process, it assumed responsibility for all
outstanding interests, including claims for restitution or reimbursement even though
American may not have been the direct recipient of the money or benefits paid to its
predecessors. It did, however, receive the property which had been totally paid for by
Margetts to the predecessors and for which American agreed it was receiving value for which
it was willing to allow a credit of $150,000. Requiring American, or its successor, New West,
to reimburse funds to Margetts pursuant to an equitable claim of unconscionable forfeiture
or unjust enrichment, is entirely consistent with all of the foregoing cases and with the
general principle of law expressed in 77 AM JUR 2d, Vendor and Purchaser § 616, at page
745:
[A] person who takes a deed of land, but who is not entitled to
protection as a bona fide purchaser, takes subject to the interest of
another under a prior agreement by the vendor to convey. In the
latter situation, the grantee takes the land impressed with a trust in
favor of the original vendee. A fortiori, the grantee takes subject to
the prior contract of sale, where he expressly takes subject thereto,
or where the title was procured by assurance that the grantee would
convey to the vendee under the executory contract.
Allowing New West to escape that obligation and to keep, without reimbursement, the entire
interest in the condominium, just because it is an assignee of the developers, is still
unconscionable and contrary to the principles of equity expressed in the foregoing cases and
12

authorities. This Court's cursory treatment of this principle in its Memorandum Decision
simply does not address these equitable principles. The cases clearly apply these principles
to successors in interest to the seller and the buyer irrespective of whether or not those
successors received the payments made or other value given by the buyer. The inequity is
still present. The Court should keep in mind that the inequity involved in this case is seven
times as bad as that in the prior Utah cases, that is, the ratio of the amount forfeited to the
seller's actual damages in this case is seven times as great as the ratio held unconscionable
in prior Utah cases which required reimbursement to the buyer. There is, therefore, far
greater reason to apply the principle of unconscionable forfeiture in this case than in any
prior reported case.
POINT II
QUANTUM MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WAS NOT
PLEADED NOR PROVED BY NEW WEST AND CANNOT BE
THE BASIS FOR THE RECOVERY OF RENTAL VALUE.
The Court's Memorandum Decision recognized that the judgment for rental
value was not based on a lease or similar possessory agreement providing for rent but,
without reliance on any authority, stated that quantum meruit is the proper basis for such
a judgment. This overlooked the requirement that quantum meruit must be based on a
properly pleaded cause of action and upon proper proof. First Investment Co. v. Andersen,
621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980). New West did not plead a cause of action for quantum
meruit nor did it attempt to prove one. Unjust enrichment does not exist because Margetts
has lost his entire $150,000 interest in the condominium and it is, therefore, not inequitable
that he retain any benefit he may have received, which is an essential element of unjust
enrichment. Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County. 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 1987). It also
overlooked the requirement that "recovery for quantum meruit presupposes that no
enforceable written or oral contract exists." Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d
576,578 (Utah 1992). The existence of the Condominium Purchase Agreement, which New
West elected not to enforce, precludes any application of unjust enrichment. The Court's
reference to Bailev-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurset 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994), as authority
for an award based on quantum meruit is misplaced because in that case unjust enrichment
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was both pleaded and proved and was awarded because there was no enforceable contract
between the parties. That is not the case here. Accordingly, there is no basis for an award
of rent.
POINT III
DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER WERE IMPROPER
NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER SERVICE ON
MARGETTS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF NO SERVICE ON HIS
WIFE AND THE FAILURE TO QUALIFY UNDER THE STATUTE.
The Memorandum Decision refused to consider Margetts' challenge to the
unlawful detainer award simply because it claimed improper service was not raised as an
affirmative defense. That, however, was not the only challenge to the unlawful detainer
award. New West simply did not come within the terms of the unlawful detainer statute
because there was no lease of the property for "an indefinite time with monthly or other
periodic rent reserved", as required by §78-36-3(1 )(b), U.C.A., the only provision which could
apply in this case. New West also failed to serve or join Mrs. Margetts in this action, who
was also a resident in the condominium. Under the doctrine of Perkins v. Spencer. 121
Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1952), the failure to serve and join Mrs. Margetts
precludes a judgment for any more than nominal damages.
POINT IV
THE COURTS DEFERENCE TO THE LOWER COURT ON
CREDIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY MISSED
THE POINT THAT THE LOWER COURTS FINDINGS WERE
NOT BASED ON CREDIBILITY BUT ON THE LEGAL ISSUE OF
REASONABLENESS,
This Court's refusal to review the findings of the lower court based on
"institutional necessity" would be understandable if the lower court'sfindingshad been based
on the credibility or demeanor of the witnesses. But that was not the basis for the lower
court's findings. Rather, the lower court based itsfindingson what it considered to have
been reasonable. The court stated that "it was not reasonable for Defendant Margetts to
rely upon any assumed representations or conduct by Mr. Snow." [R. 925, lines 17-19]. The
lower court apparently recognized the impossibility of going back three years to determine
credibility when it had not even considered that at the time of trial Instead, it tried to
14

determine what would have been reasonable under the circumstances. What is reasonable
is a matter of law and can be determined by the appellate court without any deference to
the lower court's determination. The adequacy of the findings of the lower court should,
therefore, be reviewed by this Court. Credibility and demeanor of witnesses is not involved.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests a rehearing of this matter in order that the Court
may properly and adequately consider:
1) Whether the principle of unconscionable or unjust forfeiture should apply to
an assignee or successor in interest who in fact received value from the buyer and is unjustly
enriched by taking the entire interest in the condominium which is forfeited?
2) Whether the principles of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment really exist
in this case to justify an award of rental value against Margetts?
3) Whether New West comes within the strict terms of the unlawful detainer
statute and is entitled to damages thereunder when it failed to serve and join as a party
Margetts' wife?
4) Whether the findings of the lower court are adequate in view of the fact that
they were based on reasonableness, a legal issue, rather than upon credibility and demeanor
of witnesses?
DATED this 9th day of November, 1994.

BACJQ^Af^CLARK & MARSH
Ralph J. Marth
Attorneys for Appellant
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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme.
ORME, Associate Presiding Judge:
We again consider this case, in which defendant John L.
Margetts appeals a judgment against him. This court previously
remanded for the trial court's reconsideration of three issues.
Margetts now appeals the judgment entered on remand, and also
pursues the issues raised in his first appeal, which were not
dealt with in our prior decision.
SCOPE OF REMAND
Margetts contends that the trial court, on remand, failed to
follow the mandate of our prior decision. Our decision directed
the trial court to make additional findings, "with leave to
conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may deem
appropriate," but deliberately did not prescribe any particular
procedure. Acting on our broadly phrased mandate, the trial
court scheduled a hearing, received memoranda and proposed
findings from both sides, and heard oral arguments prior to

issuing its supplementary findings and conclusions. We see no
reversible error in the scope of the trial court's procedure on
remand.
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS
The supplementary factual findings on the issues of agency
and fraud turn on the conflicting testimony of Margetts and
attorney Gerald Snow concerning their meeting in Snow's office on
November 14, 1984. While the trial court's findings are
intellectually troubling because the court made judgments about
the credibility and demeanor of witnesses three years after
trial, as a matter of institutional necessity we have no choice
but to defer to the trial court's determination in this respect.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Terry v. Price Mun. Corp.. 784 P.2d
146, 147 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) (great deference given to
findings based on conflicting live testimony); Mostrona v.
Jackson. 866 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (witness credibility
is within province of trial court), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154
(Utah 1994). There is no recognized exception to the great
deference shown to trial court decisions concerning witness
credibility merely because significant time has elapsed between
when the witness was heard and when the credibility decision was
made.1 Accordingly, we cannot disturb the trial court's
determination that Snow was not an agent of American Savings and
Loan Association, and thus did not commit fraud for which
American Savings and its successor, New West Savings and Loan,
are answerable.2
INCONSISTENT REMEDIES
In our previous decision, we questioned the consistency of
the trial courts determination that Margetts must forfeit
$150,000 under the condominium sales contract with American
Savings, while at the same time awarding fair renral value

1. Practically speaking, the trial court at least heard the
testimony in question and observed the two witnesses at a prior
point in time. This court has never had that opportunity.
2. Absent agency and fraud, Margetts's basic position becomes
untenable. Without agency, the 20% agreement is not chargeable
to American Savings, which was not a party to it. Without fraud,
and given a common-sense reading of the 20% agreement, it clearly
does not vest Margetts with the additional discounts to which he
believes he is entitled.
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damages to New West for the period during which Margetts had
occupied the condominium without permission. Although the trial
court's explanation on remand is sparse, our original perception
of inconsistency appears to have reflected something of a
misunderstanding.
Under the condominium sales contract between Margetts and
American Savings, the $150,000 credit did not represent money or
tangible property actually paid to American Savings that would be
subject to unjust forfeiture in favor of American Savings.
Margetts conveyed his Park City condominium pursuant to a
separate contract with different parties. While we deeply
sympathize with Margetts's significant losses through the debtplagued financial wranglings in which the Garden Falls/Terrace
Falls project's original partners engaged, the fact remains that
American Savings negotiated a different contract with Margetts
and received no money or tangible property in the amount of
$150,000. The discount or credit American Savings offered
Margetts in an effort to work out a deed-in-lieu resolution of
the failing project simply does not equate to the cash payments
that have been the subject of judicial intervention to set aside
unconscionable forfeitures in the real estate contract context.
See Soffe v. Ridd. 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1983) (forfeiture
not enforced against buyer who paid $20,725 to seller); Johnson
v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977) (forfeiture not enforced
against buyer who paid $34,596 to seller).
Margetts is liable for the fair rental value for the period
after he remained on the premises without permission, even absent
a lease or similar possessory agreement. New West is therefore
entitled to fair rental value on the basis of quantum meruit,
even though no enforceable written or oral contract existed.
Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1994).
INTEREST, TREBLE DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY FEES
The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. To
bear prejudgment interest, damages must be fixed with a
mathematical certainty that is generally lacking when the
doctrine of quantum meruit is relied upon. Id. at 427; Shoreline
Dev.. Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992).
In this case, the trial court was only able to determine the fair
rental value of Margetts's condominium through expert testimony
and estimates made by the project's property manager.
Accordingly, the requisite certainty was lacking.
Margetts is liable for treble damages under the Utah
unlawful detainer statute despite his contention that New West
failed to comply with service requirements for the Notice to Quit
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as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-6 (Supp. 1994).3 While
improper service is a valid defense, it is waived unless
explicitly raised by motion or as an affirmative defense. See
Fowler v. Seiter. 838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah App. 1992). The
trebling of unlawful detainer damages is mandatory rather than
discretionary. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) (Supp. 1994).
On remand, the trial court, while indicating there was merit
in Margetts's argument, refused to reconsider the issue of
attorney fees, based on a mistaken assumption that this court
disposed of this issue by not addressing it in the prior
Memorandum Decision. However, our previous decision was silent
on the other issues, including attorney fees, only because the
firs-c order of business was to secure adequate findings on the
key issues which were remanded. It was not this court's intent
to reduce the entire appeal to the three issues on remand. See
Beltran v. Mvers. 701 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 462
U.S. 1134, 103 S.Ct. 3115 (1983).
With limited exceptions not applicable here, attorney fees
are awarded only if provided for by statute or contract. Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Tholen v.
Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah App.), cert, denied/ 860 P.2d
943 (Utah 1993). The only contract containing attorney fee
provisions was the condominium sales agreement with American
Savings which Margetts refused to perform. However, New West was
granted remedies through the unlawful detainer statutes and
principles of quantum meruit. In an unlawful detainer action,
fees are awarded only if so provided by a lease or other
possessory agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) (Supp. 1994).
It is undisputed that no such lease or agreement existed.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's findings on the remanded issues
of agency and fraud, and defer to its chosen procedural methods.
There is no error in its award of rental value damages, which are

3. The pertinent unlawful detainer provisions in effect at the
time notice was served are substantively identical to the current
codification.
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required to be trebled. We vacate the award of prejudgment
interest and attorney fees.

Gregory K. Orme,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

930450-CA

5

